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ANALYSIS OF CORDOVA

CAsE-Continued

AN

examination of the pertinent section of the new code (18 U.S.C.
7) shows that in the revision it was found unnecessary to repeat the
words so strongly relied upon by the Cordova case. The words "on" in
Ground One, and "upon" in Ground Two were entirely eliminated.
The heading was also changed, and the word "vessel" which appeared
in the older version also disappeared. The new section starts as follows:
"SECTION 7-SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED.

The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," as used in this title, includes:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdic-

tion of any particular State, and any vessel belonging, etc."

West Publishing Company, which helped in the official revision,
have issued a book - "Congressional Service, pp. 2175-2885 - 80th
Congress - 2nd Session - Epochal Legislation - New Title 18, Etc."
In the copious "Revisor's Notes," which follow the official text, an
explanation is given, section by section, of the historybehind, and the
reasons for, changes in each section. Regarding this new section, the
comments indicated where some of the words not appearing in old
section 451 were transferred from other parts of the former code, why
certain new words were added, that "the enumeration of the Great
Lakes was omitted as unnecessary" and that "other minor changes were
necessary now that the section defined a term rather than a place of
commission of crime or offense; however the extent of the special juris* Continued from Autumn Issue of Journal, 18 J. Air L. & Com. 427 (1951).
* The opinions or assertions contained in this article are those of the writer
and are not to be construed as reflecting the views of the Navy Department.
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diction as originally enacted has been carefully followed." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It would thus appear that among the "minor changes" which allow
the "extent of the specialjurisdiction as originally enacted" to be "carefully followed" is the entire elimination of the presently contentious
words "on" and "upon" which appear to have been partially relied
upon as a basis for the Cordova decision.
The Cordova case refers to a few examples of what may be considered the expanding concepts of our law, but unfortunately failed to
recognize the signs of progress which they indicate. On p. 302 this
comment appears:
"It is perhaps irrelevant, but I have little doubt that had it wished
to do so Congress could, under its police power, have extended federal criminal jurisdiction to acts committed on board an airplane
owned by an American national, even though such acts had no effect
upon national security,"
A footnote at this point indicates the situation where, under the
present status of the law, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the exercise of Federal jurisdiction over acts which took place "on land within
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, U.S. v. Bowman, 1922, 260 U.S.
94 *
*

*; United States v. Chandler, D.C. Mass. 1947, 72 F. Supp. 240
certiorori denied 1949, 336 U.S. 918."

*

* *

It is to be noted here, that this principle of the Bowman case, regarding jurisdiction of acts on land of a foreign sovereign, goes much further than that which was later disapproved in the Cordova case when
it discusses the case of U.S. v. Flores (1933) 289 U.S. 137. Both Bowman
and Flores cases will be further discussed. It may also be pertinent to
say that the ancient British courts of admiralty had jurisdiction over
acts of Englishmen abroad, irrespective of .the element of National
security, or of location.
The judge's footnote continues:
"But Congressional power over vessels on the high seas, or in
admiralty waters outside the jurisdiction of any state, is even
wider. It can be exercised to punish acts (such as assault) which
have no relationship to national security. A different theory of
jurisdiction comes into play, namely, that the American flag vessel
is itself territory of the United States. There are no international
complications, as there might be for land crimes against a person."

With these views expressed in the footnote, as being the possibilities within the power of Congress, it is most unfortunate, that the deductions drawn from the cases which the court next considered failed
to elicit the view that Congress had already exercised the necessary
powers for full jurisdiction in this case.
The opinion continues:
"In U.S. v. FLORES, 1933, 289 U.S. 137, 53 S C t. 580, 77 L Ed

1086, the Supreme Court of the United States WENT THE EXTREME LENGTH OF holding that the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States, under this very statute (18 U.S.C. Sec. 451), WAS
BROAD ENOUGH to include acts committed on an American flag
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vessel, EVEN THOUGH SHE WAS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Flores Case can bear much closer examination than the bit
given to it in the case as set forth above. As a matter of fact, it is a
remarkably well-reasoned case and now stands as a leading case in
Admiralty Law. Mr. Justice Stone therein made a most valuable contribution to the natural growth of our law. Two phases of the problem
in that case are directly material to our aviation question, i.e. (1) the
extent of the waters of the world which meet the "locality" test necessary for criminal jurisdiction, and (2) the development of the theory
of "extraterritorial" jurisdiction over U.S. property which finds itself
outside the physical limits of the United States.
In the Flores case an American citizen was tried and convicted in
the District Court of Pennsylvania, as the first port of entry, for a
murder of another U.S. citizen committed on board a U.S. merchant
vessel moored at Matadi, Belgian Congo, 250 miles inland on the
Congo River - i.e. far above the ocean tide's ebb and flow. Mr. Justice
Stone, in the opinion affirming the conviction said:
"The appellee insists that even though Congress has power to define and punish crimes on American vessels in foreign waters, it
has not done so by the present statute, since the criminal jurisdic- tion of the United States is based upon the territorial principle and
the statute cannot rightly be interpreted to be a departure from that
principle. But the language of the statute making it applicable to
offenses committed on an American vessel outside the jurisdiction.
of a State "within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States," is broad enough to incldde crimes in the territorial
waters of a foreign sovereign. For Congress, by incorporating in the
statute the very language of the constitutional grant of power, has
made its exercise of the power coextensive with the grant."

How closely the contention of appellee of the Flores case parallels
that of our jurisdictional question, and how aptly Mr. Justice Stone
has put his finger on the appropriate answer to our problem, i.e. that
the authority is already there and has been there from the very beginning of our FederalSystem! Except for the case of U.S. v. Rogers (1893)
150 U.S. 249, it appears to have been generally believed that Federal
courts lacked jurisdiction of offenses committed in strictly foreign
territorial waters. In the Rogers case (assault on a U.S. vessel on the
Canadian side of the Detroit river) the Federal court took jurisdiction
by virtue of belief that the Great Lakes were "High Seas," and the
Detroit river was a tributary thereof, and that the offense was therefore punishable under Act of Congress of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 115)
and within the meaning of Title 18, U.S.C. 455 (former code - and
now sec. 113).
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Stone in the footnote, the Flores case
marks the latest link in the chain of cases which have returned the
extent of the U.S. admiralty jurisdiction to the point where it was
under our colonial governors at the time of our Revolution and as it
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was in early English law before its power was whittled down by three
centuries of open warfare with the powerful common law judges.
The English Admiralty test is "Ebb and Flow" of tide. But in England all navigable rivers are tidal. It took Mr. Justice Taney, in "The
Genesee Chief" (1881) (12 How. 457) to show that the true test was
"navigability" - that in England this was synonomous with ebb and
flow of tide, but that the healthy development of our law, to keep pace
;with expanding inland commerce, required our true test to be "navigability" - and that jurisdiction for offenses on all navigable waters
were intended by the drafters of the Constitution. But it has taken
many cases to bring all inland waterways, rivers, canals and interstate
lakes, under the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal Couris.
It is to be fervently hoped that we won't make the same antiquated
mistakes in the development of the case history of our rapidly expanding aviation industry.
The Flores case also brought up to date another phase of the law
concerning jurisdiction in cases of crimes similar to the problem we
face in the Cordova decision. It was claimed for a long time that murder could not be punished in a U.S- court, if committed on a U.S. vessel in foreign waters. It should be noted, however, that in this type
of case, there is, theoretically, an alternative jurisdiction, i.e. the foreign sovereign in whose waters it is committed. It is now clear that
under the Flores case, U.S. Federal courts do have that jurisdiction by
virtue of the fact that foreign waters fall within the definition of
Ground Two. In Ground Two the exclusive word "State" means a
"U.S. State" and not a "foreign State."
In 1820 such a murder took place in the tidal waters at the mouth
of the river Tigris, below Canton, at a point about 100 yards from
shore off Wampoa, China. It came to trial in a U.S., Federal Court.
U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76). Since the Chinese at
that time looked down on all foreigners, and would not be bothered
with our private affairs, 'and since the U.S. Federal court thought that
'it lacked jurisdiction in tidal rivers within a foreign state, the defendant went free.
In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court in the Flores case has
absolutely overruled the Wiltberger case,'the latter case almost to the
exclusion of all others, is approved and cited in the Cordova case as
"the proper approach" to our problem of airspace over the high seas.
The question of where the High Seas starts, relative to distance
from the shore, has not always been uniformly answered. Under International Law, the "Three Mile Limit" is now almost universally accepted, and for the United -States the limiting line between high seas
and inland waters was fixed by statute in 1895 and may be found in
Title 33 U.S.C. 151. But a century ago it was generally held that
jurisdiction to try Offenses committed on the high seas (Ground One)
reached to cases very close to the shore. At that time the present three
mile limit was not accepted by many nations. In U.S. v. Ross (C.C.R.I.
1813) Fed. Cas. No. 16, 196, the Court said "High Seaswithin the Act

HIGH SEAS CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

of April 30, 1780 meant any waters on the sea coast which were outside
the boundary of the low-water mark." A few outstanding cases where
this low watermark test, even in foreign open road steads, was approved are the following: Judge Story in U.S. v. Hamilton (C. C.
Mass. 1816); Fed. Cas. No. 15290; U.S. v. Seagrist (C.C.N.Y. 1860)
Fed. Cas. No. 16, 245; U.S. v. Morel (C.C.Pa. 1834); Fed. Cas. No.
15,807. One case went so far as to say that the section between high
and low watermarks is "high seas" to the extent that it happens at
the moment to be covered with water, and land when not covered.
These definitions may well be considered correct as of that time, on
the basis of the then existing definition of High Seas in International
Law. It is to be wondered why similar construction was not applied in
the Wiltberger case which happened very close in time to cases cited
above, and many other similar decisions. The- Wiltberger decision
would thus appear to be wrong on two grounds: first that the court
failed to apply the meaning of High Seas as it existed at that time and
convict on Ground One, and secondly under the recent authority of
the Flores case it would be punishable on Ground Two.
Regarding the second part of Mr. Justice Stone's remarks in the
Flores case - i.e. that concerning affording a U.S. merchant vessel an
extraterritorial status - it is submitted that exactly the same status
is due to and could be accorded to a U.S. airplane, public or private.
This special status for vessels, while outside home waters is now universally accepted in International Law. For an able exposition of the
rights and duties, and which nation should take jurisdiction, see Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1. In general terms, the U.S. view is that, for
matters which effect only the internal activities of a foreign ship in
U.S. waters, the vessel's home government should hear the case, but if
the offense is one which does or may affect the tranquility of the port,
if it should become known, the local sovereign should take jurisdiction.
There are also a few treaties regulating this subject.
In the Cordova case, after depreciating the Flores and Rogers cases,
and two more yet to be covered, i.e. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69
and U.S. .v. Holmes (1820) 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 412 - the opinion
(p. 303) goes on to say:
"But none of these cases, nor the principles on which they rest
would justify the extension of the words "high seas" to the air space
over them. It is at this point that the case at bar, I think, becomes
one of first impression. The proper approach is, nevertheless, to
be gathered, for example, from United States v. Wiltberger."
Does this mean that the Cordova decision stands for the principle
that the proper approach to the air law problem should be to turn
back the hands of time 130 years - and to overrule the recent wellreasoned "approach" of the Flores case, and to fail entirely to recognize
that the advent of widespread use of aircraft into the high seas areas is
merely a new application of an ever changing world?
It would appear that, of all the cases considered by the court, the
Holmes case (supra) perhaps most clearly points the way to the proper
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solution of our high seas problem. Since, however, the Skiriotes case
was first mentioned by the Court, it deserves a few remarks here. Concerning the Skiriotes case the opinion merely comments (p. 303)
"The Court (Supreme Court) has even suggested that a state of
,the Union may make a regulation valid and effective to rule conduct on the high seas, so long as the federal government has not
occupied the field."
In this connection on p. 304, in the summing up of the Cordova
case, there appears this statement:
"as the law now stands, acts like those committed by Cordova will
go unpunished, unless the law of the domicile of the corporation

can be considered to cover them."
It would hardly be amiss to presume that most state aviation authorities have received a rude awakening by the thoughts conveyed
above. It is difficult to conceive that they must have understood that
the Federal Government was powerless to carry out its obligations in
what would seem to be its exclusive jurisdictional domain, and that ii
was up to the States to fill in the gap. At least, no State statute has
been found which purports to take over the High Seas Criminal Law
field in aviation matters. The plane in the Cordova case was under
charter by a California corporation. California is one of the leading
States, both in aviation activities and in laws applicable to aviation.
It does have a law ("Laws of Calif." 1945, Ch. 941) which covers crimes
of the assault category committed in aircraft, but the law is strictly
territorial in effect and applicable only to acts committed while over
California. Under a similar statute in Texas, a murder conspiracy
conviction was obtained in a Texas State Court (Texas v. Dodson)
(1933 U.S. Av.R 256). But it is highly doubtful whether, even if a
state law did attempt to confer such extraterritorial jurisdiction in a
high seas situation, it would be held constitutional on a direct test.
It would appear to come under the pronouncement of the District
Court of N.Y. in 1921, U.S. v. Bowman, 287 F. 588, where it was said
that for the purposes of determining the applicability of the criminal
laws, the high seas outside of a marine league from the shore and outside of the jurisdiction of a particular state are constructively a part of
the territory of the United States, and are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the U.S. as distinguished from that of a State. This Bowman
opinion was approved by the Supreme Court in 206 U.S. 94 but case
was reversed on other grounds. Unless it can be said that the dictum
in the Skiriotes case overrules the Bowman case it would appear that
the high seas is an exclusively federal jurisdictional area. Similar
logic should apply if the plane is over a sister State, or over "exclusively
Federal land or water areas."
It is possible, however, that in some instances a state law and state
jurisdiction may be applicable to certain crimes, parts of which are
committed in planes over the high seas and parts within the state. An
example would be the crime of murder, where the act, which later
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produced the death, occurred in a plane over the high seas, and the
death, and therefore the crime itself - is consummated on land. Analagous cases where the first act took place on a ship on the high seas are
Commonwealth v. MacLoon (1869) (101 Mass. 1) and U.S. v. McGill
(C.C. Pa. 1806) (Fed. Cas. No. 15,676). Similarly, if the first act of a
chain of acts which make up the crime, starts within a state, while the
final act occurs over the high seas, the state of initial embarkation
should also have jurisdiction. This type of situation is specifically covered in Title 18 U.S. C. 3236. Quere - in the Cordova case, did Cordova also commit an offense against the United States or Puerto Rico
when he carried liquor aboard the plane?
Returning now to the Holmes case, we approach a phase of our
problem which may hold the key to the desired solution. It is 130
years old, yet one of the few U.S. cases which pronounce a rule clearly
falling under Ground One. The most important aspect is the deliberate
elimination from the jurisdictional test of the magic word "Vessel."
That word has loomed so large in practically all other cases that it has
partaken of the nature of a stumbling block to proper legal thinking.
It deserves a few special remarks. Hundreds of needless cases, especially
in admiralty law, have taken time, energy, and expense, because of its
deceptive meaning, until today the broad definition indicated below
has been established. Yet it now seems that the evil genius "vessel" has
had a rebirth as a trouble maker, in the field of Aviation Law. In Title
1 U.S. C. sec. 3, dealing with rules of Statutory Construction, "vessel"
is defined as "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being used, as a means of trafisportation on
water." The new Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 9 (old s. 501) defines the possessory aspects of "Vessel of the U.S.," and now makes it applicable to
the entire title. It may be seen that the modern definition is very broad
and includes all types of watercraft, be they steamships, sailing vessels,
row boats, rafts of logs, dredges, floating bath houses, and even under
certain circumstances wrecks and sunken drillboats (Sprague and
Healy, "Cases on Admiralty" (1950) pp. 84-86). But as already stated,
the word "Vessel" does not appear in the legal description of Ground
One or Two, but it is "the sum and substance" of Ground Three.
Admitted, an airplane is not a "vessel," even when ditched upon the
water. But in tort law, claims are allowed for High Seas salvage work,
by or upon airplanes. And two recent compensation cases for death
due to plane accidents, on and over the high seas, were settled under the
"Death on the High Seas Act" (46 U.S.C. 761). In Hart v. Transcontinental Western (1950 U.S. Av.R. 287) the navigator was killed when
blown out of a plane at 19,000 feet. In Lacy v. Wiggins (1951 U.S.
Av.R. 16 and 224) a negligent repairman ashore was held liable for a
plane crash at sea.
In the Holmes case it was pointed out that, to constitute a crime at
sea, it need not be confined to a "vessel." That case, tried in the Circuit
Court of Massachusetts in 1818, concerned an indictment alleging stab-
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bing with a knife, by defendant Holmes, of another U.S. mariner named
Reed, on board a vessel, following which Reed was cast into the water
where he died by drowning. The vessel had changed hands several
times under claim of prize, but was at the time not lawfully sailing
under the flag of any nation, and was therefore considered piratical.
For "murder" the offense is deemed committed where the death took
place. The defendant contended here that, since the death took place
in the water, there was no offense committed under the same statute
under consideration in the Cordova case. He claimed that to warrant
conviction, all the acts, including the death which made it murder,
must be committed on board a "Vessel." Holmes was convicted, and
the Supreme Court of the U.S. affirmed the conviction, and laid down
this extremely significant rule of law (p. 416) :
"The court is of opinion, that it makes no difference, whether the

offense was committed on board of a vessel, or in the sea, as by

throwing the deceased overboard and drowning him, or by shooting

him, when in the sea, though he was not thrown overboard. THE
WORDS OF THE ABOVE ACT OF CONGRESS ARE GENERAL,
and speak of certain OFFENSES committed UPON THE HIGH

SEAS, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY VESSEL WHAT-

SOEVER on which they should be committed; and NO REASON is

perceived, why a more restricted meaning should be given to the
expressions of the law, than they literally import." (Emphasis
supplied.)

The Supreme Court here clearly recognized the existence of cases
falling into the first and second location categories of the Statute, i.e.
where a "vessel" is not a necessary element of the crime.
A more recent case falling under Ground One was U.S. v. Miller
(N.J. 1917), 242 F. 907, cert. denied 245 U.S. 660. There it was held
that stealing fish from a "pound" erected by American citizens on the
high seas area, was punishable under the laws of the U.S.
There is another group of cases which prove that vessels, as limited
in the statute, do not occupy the whole field. In recent years there
have been examples of cases which can only be upheld by saying that
they fall within grounds One or Two, since they clearly are not within
any, of the other Grounds. Grounds Three and Four specify "vessels
of the United States," and it is obvious that "Foreign Vessels" do not
fall into either of these grounds. Federal courts have repeatedly taken
jurisdiction in cases where only foreign vessels are concerned, both in
collision and serious assault cases. In some the acts took place in U.S.
waters, 9 in some on the high seas, and some even in foreign waters.' 0
The Federal Court exercises its discretion as to whether it will hear
a case in this class, but it does have jurisdiction, under Section 7.
;In the closing paragraphs of the Cordova case, it is stated: "What
I gather is that there is little likelihood, if any, of an international
9 Wildenhus's Case, 120, U.S. 1.
10Ingen v. H.K.K.K. (9CCA, 1946); (112 F. 2d. 564); The Mondu (2CCA
1939); (162 F. 2d. 459); see also Panama R.R. v. Napier Shipping (1897) (166
U.S; 280) and the exhaustive opinion on the subject in The Avon (Brown's Adm.

170).
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agreement involving, as it necessarily would, difficult and delicate questions of sovereignty." The meaning here is not too clear, but the inference seems to be that international agreement could not be reached
giving the country of the flag of an airplane jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board while outside the national domain. Even at the
present moment England, France and Italy, whose legal systems are different from our constitutional system, effectively cover these cases in
their written law. In those countries a case involving facts present in
U.S. v. Cordova would present no jurisdictional problem. International
agreement is already in existence requiring that "Each member nation
undertaking to adopt measures to insure that every aircraft

* * *

carry-

ing its nationality mark, wherever it may be, shall comply with the rules
and regulations relating to flight and maneuver of aircraft there in
force. Each member State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all
persons violating the regulations applicable." (International Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago, 1944), Appendix I Art. VIII, section 6 effective June 6, 1945, and the U.S. being a treaty member). While this
refers to Rules of Flight, it can justly be said that all nations already
expect that other nations will carry out their duty to punish criminal
acts on their own flag-airships over the high seas, especially if its affects
a foreign national. But if further international agreement is necessary
on that score, either within the United Nations organization or by
treaty, it is seriously doubted that quick assent would be refused.
In the light of the position in which a foreign passenger on one of
our planes has been placed by the Cordova case it would be interesting
to follow the above thought a bit further. Until the effects of that
decision are overcome, a crime committed over the High Seas aboard
a U.S. plane - using assault as an example - falls under one of the

following categories:
(1) U. S. passenger strikes another U.S. passenger.
(2) Member of plane crew strikes a U.S. passenger.
(3) Foreign passenger of State X strikes a U.S. passenger.
(4) U.S. passenger strikes a foreign passenger of State X.
(5) Member of plane crew strikes a foreign passenger of State X.
(6) Foreign passenger of State X strikes a foreign passenger of
State X.
(7) Foreign passenger of State Y strikes another foreign passenger
of State X.
(8) U.S. passenger strikes member of U.S. crew. (Cordova case).
(9) Foreign passenger of State X strikes member of U.S. crew.
In all nine classes no U.S. court - Federal or State - appears to

have jurisdiction to punish the offender. Whether the foreign courts
in classes (3), (6), (7) and (9) may punish their own offending citizens is a matter for their own domestic law to decide. In classes (2) and
(5) the offending crew member would probably, as a side issue, receive
the indirect punishment of loss of job and, if a licensed person, might,
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through action of a Federal or State regulatory body, lose his license
as well.
Since, except as above, punishment of offender is unlikely, what
redress for the injury to person and dignity of the assaulted foreigner
and'his government (X) would be available under classes (4) (5) (6)
and (7) ? If State X asks the embarrassing question, it is hardly likely
that a mere "So sorry, but our laws do not cover" reply from our State
Department would satisfy. A grave formal official apology, and possibly
compensation via special Act of Congress, would appear required. The
weakness of the present U.S. position is expressed in the following
quotations from two of the leading American exponents of international law:
"The individual State cannot itself alter the international stand'ard. The freedom of a State in adopting a form of government of
its own choice, or in framing a constitution of its own devising, is
always subject to the requirement that the territorial sovereign shall
not thereby render itself impotent to fulfill acknowledged duties
,of doing justice with respect to foreign powers. If a State acting
designedly, renders itself deficient in this regard, it not only fails
to escape responsibility, but also, by reason of its conduct, invites
the intervention of aggrieved States.""
and
"Lack of legislation which may be requisite to enable a State to
fulfill its international obligations, however arising, never affords2 a
defense in public law for the consequences of such inaction."'
It thus appears that the Cordova decision has placed us in a position which is legally unsound, internationally as well as domestically.
It is the belief of the writer that Congress must have thought that
thisi High Seas aviation jurisdictional authority was included in the
Statutes and Codes, otherwise it would surely have enacted additional
laws. Within this field Congress has already seen fit to include aircraft
with other vehicles or vessels in certain general laws, i.e., To provide
punishment for stealing an aircraft (Title 16, U.S.C. sec. 231); For
burglary on an aircraft (Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 2117); for Stowaways on
vessels or aircraft (Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 2199) ; Espionage from aircraft
over national defense areas (Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 793). And it has
defined aircraft as used in the Motor Vehicle Act (Title 18 U.S.C.
sec. 2311) as "Aircraft means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or for flight in the
air." Since in these statutes Congress provides for offenses on or over
the land, wouildn't it be logical to assume that it believes that similar
acts, committed over the high seas, just as offensive to our sense of
justice or to our national security, were already covered by existing
law? If it will save confusion and heartache to laymen, lawyers and the
bench alike, it might be well for Congress to clarify the subject by
enacting into law an additional subsection to Title 18 U.S. Code Sec-

11 Charles Cheney Hyde "International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States," Section 267.

12 Elihu Root (Vol. IV. Proceedings American Society International Law,
p. 25), cited by Hyde (ibid.).
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tion 7, similar to the proposal of the. McCarran bill.13 Such a procedure
was followed, in 1845 in an almost identical situation, and touching
this very same code section, clarifying the federal jurisdiction on the
Great Lakes.
MARGINAL SEAS

The recent widespread extension of the principle of "Marginal
Sea" .areas has already been remarked. Its chief significance in our
present consideration is that it presents new problems in the superimposed air spaces, for the areas are large, imperfectly defined, the
13

See note (1).

Since this article was written, the McCarran Bill S. 2149

was passed by the Senate on February 26, 1952, with only one minor change, and

sent to the House of Representatives for its consideration. It now reads:
"AN ACT To confer Federal jurisdiction to prosecute certain
common-law crimes of violence when such crimes are committed on
an American airplane in flight over the high seas or over waters
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 7 of
title 18, United States Code, is hereby amended by adding at the end
thereof a new subsection reading as follows:
"(5)
Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States, or any citizen thereof, or' to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district,
or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high
seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State."
Under date of Jan. 10, 1952 Mr. McCarran, for the Judiciary Committee,
submitted a REPORT (No. 1155-Senate Calendar No. 1086) to the Senate, stating the purpose of the Bill. He said in part:
"The need * * * became apparent after the decision of * * *
UNITED STATES v. CORDOVA * * *
* * * "That aircraft was excluded from the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, by judicial decision.
The decision in UNITED STATES v. CORDOVA turned on the
point that an airplane is not a vessel within the meaning of the
"maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." This
bill would plug that gap in the original law and allow prosecutions
under title 18 for assaults, section 113; maiming, section 114; larceny, section 661; receiving stolen goods, section 662; murder, section 1111; manslaughter, section 1112; attempts to commit murder
or manslaughter, section 1113; rape, section 2031; carnal knowledge,
section 2032, and robbery, section 2111, if committed on an American plane over waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State."
The REPORT quotes a letter dated September 17, 1951 from the Department
of Justice forwarding a draft copy of the bill and recommending its enactment,
wherein the following paragraph appears:
"It is noted that the jurisdiction would be limited to the time during which the plane is in flight which would eliminate concurrent
jurisdictional problems that might arise were the offense to occur
while the plane was on the ground in a foreign airport. The jurisdiction would also be restricted under the measure to flight over the
high seas or other waters within the admittedly American jurisdiction which would avoid encroachment upon existing treaty. commitments in civil aviation law which have reserved to each participating
nation exclusive sovereignty in the air space overlying its own territorial boundaries."
While within the scope of this article (e.g. The High Seas) the McCarran
bill plugs the "gap" created by the CORDOVA decision, the Justice Department
letter raises two interesting questions regarding further "gaps" in the law:
Q. 1. Would offender go unpunished for lack of U.S. court jurisdiction if
offense is committed over land mass of a nation never covered by U.S. treaty, or

36

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

claims varied, and this airspace has heretofore been recognized as Free.
Unless this potentially complicated situation is settled with expedition
and' finality, the jurisdictional question may become confused. 14 A
discussion of the situation, and how it came about, would therefore
serve a useful purpose.
Thirty nations have set up such areas within the past few years and
others are sure to follow. Twelve nations in the Western Hemisphere
have already followed the lead of the 1945 United States Proclamations.
National claims have been made, mostly by Proclamation, but in some
instances by National Laws, or by a change in a National Constitution.
Claims vary, both in "linear distance" from the coast and "in kind."
Several go far beyond
the U.S. example. Some, as does the U.S., say
"continental shelf,"15 others set the outer limit at a fixed depth; e.g.,
the 100 fathom mark, some 200 fathoms, some 200 meters (109.36
fathoms). Chili, Peru, and Costa Rica claim the coast out to 200 miles,
into very deep water, and regardless of depth. Argentine and Chile
fix their southern limits at the South Pole, thus claiming deep water.
As to "kind," there are varying combinations of appropriations; e.g.,
of ocean bottom, subsoil, fishery waters, surface water, and in the case
of Argentina and Chile, above surface arctic ice and land areas.
There was some justification and legal precedent for the United
States fisheries Proclamation. The need was a present one, and took
into consideration the rights of other nations. But it is submitted that
the subsoil Proclamation is open to the question as to whether it might
not be unnecessary, and most unwise. It marked a glaring and unafter treaty rights are suspended or abrogated, or over portions of Antarctic or
Arctic land areas where individual sovereignty is not recognized by the U.S.?
In this connection it may be noted that the theory of "exclusive sovereignty in
airspaces" is by no means wholly undisputed. Within the present day limitations
of aircraft, it has been accepted for treaty purposes of the moment, to satisfy
the desire for protection of the land masses below. However, as heights of flight,
with new types of aircraft, increase in the future, the subject of freedom of
flight at very high altitudes everywhere may well require reopening.
Q. 2. Since under the American system of Jurisprudence, dual jurisdictional
matters are now successfully handled in many other legal fields, both in Domestic and International Law, why not have statutory authority broad enough to
confe" extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction on every U.S. plane, while anywhere
abroad, and thus insure that no offense will go unpunished if the foreign sovereign does not, or should not, hear the case, and if a U.S. court sees fit to take
jurisdiction? If necessary, the enabling statute could confer jurisdiction "subject to U.S. treaty obligations." Under the theory of the FLORES and WILDENHUS cases, jurisdiction over acts committed on U.S. VESSELS on all
waters appears to be covered, even within recognized foreign territorial waters.
This view is justified both on the "dual jurisdiction" and the "extraterritoriality"
theories. The McCarran bill clarifies the status of AIRCRAFT over "water"
but does the status over foreign "lands" also require clarification to provide for
future contingencies?
14 A start in this direction has been made by the International Law Commission of the United Nations when a draft proposal of Continental Shelf questions was considered during the summers of 1950 and 1951. See JOURNAL AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Supplement Vol. 45, pp. 139-147 for Text;
also Ibid. Vol. 46 pp. 123-128; Ibid. Supp. Vol. 44, p. 147.
15An "International Committee on Nomenclature of the Ocean Bottom Features" is now working on definitions of ocean bottom terms and "Continental
Shelf" appears to lie with outer edge somewhere between 20 and 300 fathoms,
with the conventional depth viewed at 100 fathoms. The latter is the U.S. view.
See Vol. 45 A.J.I.L., p. 245.
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worthy reversal of our traditional role as a leader of the cause of freedom in world affairs. Since it is extensive in scope, and its application
is mostly for the future rather than for the present, it is of questionable
international legality.16 Without going into lengthy details of available proof, it may be stated that an analysis of the precedents urged
by some writers in an effort to justify the Proclamation are either inapplicable or are mere individual claims which lack approval of the
world community and therefore are not International Law. It is further submitted that the U.S. example has opened a Pandora's box of
ills which, like the struggle for Freedom of the Seas, may take generations to overcome. The United States has already found it necessary
to send protests "to reserve" our "rights and interests" in sea areas
recently claimed to be under the sovereign jurisdiction of four nations,
i.e., letters on July 2, 1948 to Chile, Peru and Argentina, and on Dec.
19, 1949 to Saudi Arabia.
An adequate solution of the Airspace phase of this new territorial
Seas problem does, however, appear practicable. As already stated,
sovereignty of surface water carries with it sovereign jurisdiction of the.
'superimposed airspace. Whereas for a ship, in International Law, there
is a "right of innocent passage" through an otherwise sovereign mari-

time coastal belt, in the International Law of the Air no such doctrine
of "innocent passage" for an airplane is, as yet, recognized. To continue the present right of free transit over newly established territorial
seas, the problem would be solved by allowing all planes to continue
to fly freely through these areas and maintain that this right is in the
nature of a right of innocent passage of aircraft. The creation of such

a new right, under these conditions, will thus maintain the status quo
for the aircraft and not conflict with any new claim of sovereignty of
the sea area.
CONCLUSION

With the underlying principle of the Supreme Court rule in the
Holmes case as a guide, and without additional legislation, the Cordova
decision should have held that Federal Courts now possess jurisdiction
to try crimes committed on air craft while flying over the High Seas.
The broad original statute underlying Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 7 must have
been intended to be all inclusive as regards the High Seas, since there
is nothing new about the air above, and the water below. As in so
many other branches of the law, our Founding Fathers provided for
expanding future developments. They were not cognizant of aircraft
transportation, but they did know that in their own times transportation had advanced, and that it could be expected to continue to change.
Thus the airplane is one of the "future developments" for which the
basic law provided. It is only necessary to acknowledge this fact. Such
judicial recognition may be viewed as the natural and healthy growth
of our law, and another example of the foresight and value of the
Constitution of the United States.
16 See C. C. Hyde, Ibid., See. 145,

